User equilibrium in a congested network has been conventionally formulated using mathematical optimization procedures. These approaches assume drivers' behaviours with complete information in the sense that each driver knows the other drivers' behaviours and their payoff functions. If each driver doesn't know the other drivers' strategies, he cannot optimize his strategy. In such a situation, an adaptive heuristics may be a relevant approach to get a better solution. To establish behavioural rules of route choice under incomplete information, we use a smooth fictitious play and a regret matching model developed in game theory, and combine these two approaches. We also propose a new algorithm that can be applicable to a complex situation in traffic environments.
Introduction
Consider dynamic environment where drivers choose their routes repeatedly every day. Each driver is equipped with a route guidance system which can be used to collect the information about travel times of routes he would choose by receiving signals from the traffic control centre. Each driver knows his own payoff function, but he does not know those of the other drivers. Moreover, each driver can know in hindsight the vector of payoffs he would have obtained if he had chosen any of his possible actions. We are interested in not only such informed drivers, but also in naïve drivers, who cannot use the route guidance system. Their knowledge about travel is far restricted: a naive driver does not know the other drivers' payoff function nor his own payoff function; the only information he knows is his realized payoff obtained after finishing his trip.
To establish behavioural rules of route choice under incomplete information, we use a game-theoretic approach. In particular, we are interested in regret-based procedures that have been developed in a mutually complementary manner in the fields of game theory and machine learning. The regret-based approach is repeated games consisting of one-shot games with incomplete information, and assumes that each player knows his own payoff function but not those of the other players, and that the mixed strategy chosen by each player depends, in some ways, on his past payoffs.
One of the most appealing properties of no-regret rules is that it guarantees that a player's long-run average payoff is as large as highest payoff that can be obtained against the empirical distribution of play of the other players. This property is called Hannan consistency. For the naïve driver problem also known as the unknown game, there does not exist well-established theory in the gametheoretical framework; however, there is a numerous literature in reinforcement learning in which a single player who encounters uncertain environment is modelled.
The main object of this paper is to show that no-regret rules are suited to building learning algorithms for the route choice behaviour with incomplete information. While regret matching algorithm of Hart and Mas-Colell is suited to the informed driver problem, for naïve drivers it requires some modification because the rules should include prediction of players for unused paths. Leslie and Collins [5] propose a coupling approach of smooth fictitious play and reinforcement learning for the naïve driver problem. Our approach is similar with that of Leslie and Collins, but different in that it includes the visiting frequency to each route and identification process of the path-variance parameter.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section two, we give notations and terminologies associated with regret-based approach and flows in networks. After introducing the regret-based algorithm of Hart and Mas-Colell in Section three, we move on the main model in this paper in Section four. We firstly address a smooth fictitious play which approximates the Hannan-consistency. The smooth fictitious play assumes that all players observe the actions of all other players and also know the structure of the game. This assumption is too strong to apply directly to our problem. We need a model that lays "rule of thumb" that people are insufficiently responsive to alternatives that they do not have full knowledge about. We propose a modified approach with reinforcement learning to find equilibrium for the naïve driver problem. In the final section, we show some computational results that characterize the model proposed.
Throughout this paper, we restrict our attention to drivers' route choice behaviours for paths connecting a single origin-destination to avoid a complex notation.
Notation
A one-shot game is a three-tuple [ ,( ) ,( ) ] )
. A set of paths available to player i is denoted 
The average payoff through to time t is defined by
Let denote link travel time on
, where each link flow is defined as the time average. Then, we have travel time of path p P Î as:
Since each driver has his own value of time, his perceived cost for path p is 
In addition, we assume that only those actions k are played whose payoff against the empirical distribution of the opponents' actions is at least as the actual realized payoff, that is,
Hart and Mas-Colell [4] showed that in any finite game, if a player uses the strategy which satisfies (10) and (11), his maximum regret converges to 0.
Although distributions in the Hannan set do not correspond to any known equilibrium concept in games (except for the special case where the joint distribution is given by a product form), the concept of Hannan consistency gives a new insight into the user equilibrium in networks where flows and costs are defined as the time averages. The user equilibrium flow distributions lie in the Hannan set if the payoff of each player is no less than his best-reply payoff against the joint distribution of actions of the other players. A universal  -consistency shares the almost same meaning with Hannan-consistency; thus, it is useful for modelling a class of stochastic user equilibria.
Regret-based reinforcement learning algorithm
To solve the naïve driver problem, we combine a smooth fictitious play with reinforcement learning. Following Fudenberg and Levine 
A smooth fictitious play assumes that player i observes the actions played by his opponents and estimates the current value of each action under the assumption that the opponents' mixed strategies are not changed. To weaken the assumptions, we use reinforcement learning in which the play probabilities are determined from the actual realizations only. Specifically, each player only needs to know the payoffs he received in past periods.
We assume that player i uses a vector q of the propensity of choice which is updated every time when the actual payoffs are obtained through driving experiences. Then (16) may be rewritten as
The solutions are in the form as:
First of all, we assume that players don't have any information about path. At time t, player i randomly selects a path and estimates the propensity (regret) at time t by comparing the current payoff 
If the cost of path p at the current period is less than the previous path-cost, then player i would increase the choice probability of path p in the next period.  . Therefore, the updating processes take the form of the stochastic approximation. Although a similar model is proposed by Leslie and Collins [5] , our approach is different from their model in that our model does not require a two-time scale algorithm and that the visiting frequencies to each route is taken into account in updating the q-values .
The main problems in applications of the logit-type of route-choice models are how to restrict the path set and the identification of the path-variance parameter  . We developed a new algorithm to determine the path-variance parameter that is determined recursively depending on the pre-specified
Numerical results
The algorithms for both the informed driver problem and the naïve driver problem were tested under various types of networks and link cost functions; however, for the sake of space, an application to a random network with BPR cost functions. 
The minimum path is depicted by a green dotted line in the figure. In early stage of simulation, the set of path includes 74 routes. In the first step, we deleted overlapped routes and determine the set of effective routes with several methods like a link-likelihood (Case 1), a similarity of paths (Case 2), C-logit (Case 3) and Path-size logit (Case 4). For remained routes, the regret-based reinforcement learning algorithm is applied. For given parameter, 0.01   , the effective paths are restricted to 9 routes and the path-variance parameter converges to 0.31. Figure 2 shows the changes in the Q-values over iterations and the rejected routes by  (the paths shown in a shaded area). Figure 3 shows the convergence of the path-variance parameter with path delete procedures. In spite of procedures adapted in the first step, the path-variance parameter converges to almost same value and the algorithm achieves the user equilibrium flow patterns Convergence of the path-variance parameter.
Conclusion
If a driver doesn't know his travel environment, he cannot optimize his strategy. In such a situation, a plausible behavioural rule is adaptive and heuristic ones, based on a so-called "rule of thumb". The regret-based learning is an adaptive, heuristic approach, and is closely related with "bounded rationality". The rationality of the regret-based approach can be found in Hannan-consistency. This broader class of behavioural rationality seems to be especially useful in modelling of travel behaviours. This paper have embodied route choice behaviours in uncertain traffic environments as the informed driver problem and the naïve driver problem; and proposed the algorithm that couples a smooth fictitious play and reinforcement learning, based on the regret matching theory. The algorithm has been tested under the various schemes including several type of link cost functions, the homogeneous and heterogeneous users, and the deterministic and stochastic traffic conditions. In this paper, we have focused on the analysis on convergence of the endogenously determined path-variance parameter that is included in a logit model. We must emphasize that our algorithm can effectively calculate the user equilibrium under plausible behavioural assumptions. The path variance parameter is 0.31
